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Abstract
Many healthcare practices expose people to risks of harmful outcomes. However, 
the major theories of moral philosophy struggle to assess whether, when and why it 
is ethically justifiable to expose individuals to risks, as opposed to actually harming 
them. Sven Ove Hansson has proposed an approach to the ethical assessment of risk 
imposition that encourages attention to factors including questions of justice in the 
distribution of advantage and risk, people’s acceptance or otherwise of risks, and 
the scope individuals have to influence the practices that generate risk. This paper 
investigates the ethical justifiability of preventive healthcare practices that expose 
people to risks including overdiagnosis. We applied Hansson’s framework to three 
such practices: an ‘ideal’ breast screening service, a commercial personal genome 
testing service, and a guideline that lowers the diagnostic threshold for hypertension. 
The framework was challenging to apply, not least because healthcare has unclear 
boundaries and involves highly complex practices. Nonetheless, the framework 
encouraged attention to issues that would be widely recognised as morally pertinent. 
Our assessment supports the view that at least some preventive healthcare practices 
that impose risks including that of overdiagnosis are not ethically justifiable. Further 
work is however needed to develop and/or test refined assessment criteria and guid‑
ance for applying them.
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Introduction
In traditional Russian roulette, a player (P) voluntarily exposes her or himself to a 
one in six possibility of inflicting a lethal wound when pulling the trigger.1 What‑
ever we might think about this as a pastime, P does not seem to be wronged. In 
contrast, if P changes the game by firing the roulette gun at an unsuspecting victim 
(V), the situation becomes morally murky. Even if the chamber is empty, it seems 
plausible to claim that P has wronged V by exposing her to the possibility of a lethal 
wound, whether or not V is actually harmed. This example points to the challenge 
of morally appraising risk: if it is wrong to harm V, then to what extent is it wrong 
to impose the possibility of that same harm to V? [1] If the gun had 1000 cham‑
bers and only one bullet, would P be less wrong in playing Russian roulette with 
V? According to various scholars, while moral philosophy relies extensively on the 
idea of harming as a wrong, prevailing normative theories have trouble explaining 
when and why it is wrong to impose risk in which potential harms are not inevitable 
or certain [1, 12, 13, 26]. Sven Ove Hansson has recently attempted to address this 
problem and to specify the conditions under which risk imposition may be ethically 
justifiable in the context of complex social practices [12, 13].
This paper explores the ethical justifiability of imposing risk in healthcare, with 
a focus on disease prevention or early detection practices offered to individuals with 
the ostensible goal of reducing disease burden in populations. Specifically, we use 
Hansson’s approach to consider the ethical acceptability of preventive healthcare 
practices that impose risks associated with overdiagnosis.
The paper is organised into six sections. The first introduces the multivalent con‑
cept of risk, and its connection to related concepts such as uncertainty. The sec‑
ond summarises key challenges in the ethical appraisal of risk imposition, including 
the failure of traditional ethical analysis approaches. Section three outlines Hans‑
son’s criteria for such appraisal. In section four, overdiagnosis (ODx) and associated 
risks are explained, while section five uses Hansson’s criteria to ethically evaluate 
the risks associated with preventive practices that can generate overdiagnosis. The 
various challenges that arise in the process are discussed in section six. We conclude 
that Hansson’s criteria for risk evaluation, while difficult to apply, nonetheless are 
valuable in raising important questions about the ethical justifiability of risk‑impos‑
ing healthcare practices.
Risk, Probability and Uncertainty
Risk is a slippery concept. It is a term of art in many disciplines, and tends to be 
used with different meaning—or at least different inflection—in each. It has been an 
area of active interdisciplinary research for more than 40 years. And it is an every‑
day term, so carries common‑use meanings in additional to technical ones. Hansson 
1 Russian roulette is a game of chance in which a person spins the cylinder of a hand gun which has one 
bullet and five empty spaces in its chamber, then aims the gun at their head and pulls the trigger.
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(on whom we will rely heavily in this analysis) notes that in common usage, a risky 
situation is one in which an ‘undesirable event’ will possibly, but not certainly, occur 
[14]. Negative valence—the undesirability of the event in question—is generally 
built into the concept of risk, even though risk‑taking can be positive or generate 
benefits (for example in the context of successful investment). Hansson outlines five 
meanings of the word risk commonly used across disciplines, shown in Box 1 [14].
Hansson notes that although the technical definitions in Box 1 sometimes enter 
into the philosophical literature, philosophers tend to use the word risk in the infor‑
mal sense, that is, to refer to “a state of affairs in which a desirable or undesirable 
event may or may not occur”[14, n.p.], and that the technical definitions have not 
influenced the common‑language usage of the word.
Terminological matters are further complicated by the relation between risk and 
related concepts such as uncertainty, ignorance and indeterminacy. Brian Wynne, 
for example, has produced a taxonomy that seeks to tease‑apart these risk‑related 
concepts (Box 2) [37].
This taxonomy (which Wynne characterised as a taxonomy of uncertainty rather 
than of risk) was created in part to connect up the co‑constitutive scientific, social, 
cultural and moral dimensions of uncertainty and risk, and to argue that normative 
responsibilities and commitments are concealed in the ‘natural’ discourse of the 
sciences. His taxonomy helpfully draws out dimensions of risk [37], but also calls 
to mind Hansson’s warning that in practice these distinctions are often less clear 
than we would like them to be. Probabilities, for example, are very rarely clearly 
known, so all decisions are made under some degree of uncertainty [14]. Hansson 
has argued that it may be more fruitful to focus on action—specifically the actions 
Box 1  Five common meanings of the word ‘risk’
1. Risk = an unwanted event which may or may not occur
2. Risk = the cause of an unwanted event which may or may not occur
3. Risk = the probability of an unwanted event which may or may not occur
4. Risk = the statistical expectation value of an unwanted event which may or may not occur
The expectation value of a possible negative event is the product of its probability and some measure of 
its severity… the standard technical meaning of the term “risk” in many disciplines. Some risk analysts 
regard this as the only correct usage of the term
5. Risk = the fact that a decision is made under conditions of known probabilities (“decision under risk” 
as opposed to “decision under uncertainty”) (Verbatim quotation [14, n.p.])
Box 2  Wynne’s taxonomy of risk‑related concepts [37]
Risk: Known parameters and known probabilities of different outcomes
Uncertainty: Known parameters, but unknown probabilities of different outcomes
Ignorance: Unknown unknowns, i.e. lack of knowledge about what is not known about parameters or 
probabilities of different outcomes
Indeterminacy: Open causal chains or networks, reflecting social contingencies in the production of 
knowledge and in responses to actions. (Paraphrased from [37])
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of imposing and taking risk—and to ask under what conditions it might be justified 
to override someone’s assumed prima facie right not to be exposed to risk [14]. It is 
to these questions—and the inadequacy of traditional ethical theory in dealing with 
them—that we now turn. In what follows, we use the term ‘risk’ in Hansson’s infor‑
mal sense to refer to situations where an unwanted event may occur, the probability 
of which may be known or unknown. Thus our usage incorporates Wynne’s notions 
of risk and uncertainty; we assume, along with Hansson, that the line between risk 
and uncertainty is less clear than we would like it to be.
The Challenge of Ethically Appraising Risk Imposition
As noted in the introduction, imposing risk poses a puzzle for moral theories that 
tend to appraise determinate rather than probabilistic situations [1, 13, 26]. Determi‑
nate moral theories can tell us that it is wrong to kill an innocent, but not whether it 
is likewise wrong to impose a risk of death on an innocent, even if the activity does 
not cause her death [1]. The probability entailed by the risk seems morally impor‑
tant: many would agree that an action with a 99.9% chance of killing an innocent is 
more morally blameworthy than one with a 0.0001% chance of killing her, but moral 
theories lack a principled way of determining just what probability (or, indeed what 
associated degree) of harm is morally acceptable. As most of our actions increase 
the likelihood of some morally condemned outcome (such as the very slight pos‑
sibility of a range of possible harms to others), prohibiting all actions that entail 
risk would lead to paralysis. However, various approaches to moral decision making, 
including utilitarianism, deontology, natural rights and contract theory all lack an 
obvious way to respond to questions about when and why it can be ethically justifi‑
able to impose risk on others [1, 13, 26]. See Box 3.
Hansson works from the recognition that when human actions and their conse‑
quences are morally appraised according to the tenets of particular moral theories, 
the focus is typically on one or a limited set of actors, actions and outcomes, and 
both the range of actions and their consequences are assumed to be determinate. The 
Russian roulette example draws our attention to ethical discomfort with imposing 
risk (in this case of a lethal wound) via a single action, but it is an artificial example 
and of limited use because it effectively eliminates the need to consider potential 
beneficial as well as potential harmful consequences of actions. Hansson stresses 
that in many social situations there is an complex mix of actions and outcomes 
at play. Prevailing moral theories might tell us that action X and its certain con‑
sequence Y are impermissible, but they say little about how to evaluate action X* 
which has a mixture of unknown and/or uncertain consequences, including Y [13].
The challenge thus lies in morally appraising situations in which potential actions 
have a complex and as yet uncertain and/or unknown set of consequences. These 
situations are common in healthcare where services and interventions typically have 
many variants, each of which may have an indeterminate mixture of outcomes at 
both population and individual levels. In “Overdiagnosis” section, we examine the 
risks of ODx and associated harms as generated by some preventive healthcare prac‑
tices, but before then, the section “Hansson’s criteria for the ethical acceptability of 
235
1 3
Health Care Analysis (2019) 27:231–248 
Box 3  Hansson’s critique of responses to risk of major moral theories [12]
Moral theory
Guidance regarding spe‑
cific actions with well 
determined, knowable 
outcomes
Key question for mixtures of 
actions where the outcomes 
are not well determined 
or knowable, i.e. actions 
with a mixture of uncertain 
outcome values and prob‑
abilities
Possible answer to key 
question
Critique of possible answer
Utilitarianism
Moral appraisal depends 
entirely on utility. 
Utility of human 
actions depends solely 
on their outcomes
What utility should be assigned 
to mixtures of human actions 
and/or potential outcomes?
Actualism:
Utility assigned = util‑
ity that actually 
materialises
Cannot be action guiding
Works contrary to moral intui‑
tions e.g. when failures to act 
to avoid significant probability 
of serious harm do not actu‑
ally result in harm
Expected utility maxi-
misation:
Utility assigned = prob‑
ability weighted 
average of utilities of 
possible outcomes
Practical impossibility of 
determining utilities and prob‑
abilities
Disallows more cautious deci‑
sion making e.g. with low 
probability of catastrophe
Disallows influence of person‑
related moral reasons
Maximin:
Utility assigned = lowest 
utility associated with 
any of the possible 
outcomes
Highly sensitive to construc‑
tion of decision problem and 
where line is drawn between 
im/possible outcomes
Requires extreme caution that 




People have duties and 
rights with respect 
to actions with well 
determined properties
What duties and rights should 
be assigned with respect to 
mixtures of human actions?
Probabilistic absolut-
ism:
If an action/outcome is 
morally prohibited, 
so is any mixture in 
which the action/
outcome has non‑zero 
probability
Socially untenable. Strict elimi‑
nation of all risk would make 
human society impossible 
(e.g. no car driving because of 
risk of killing someone)
Probability limit set-
ting:
If an action/outcome is 
morally prohibited, 
so is any mixture in 
which the probability 
of that action/outcome 
is above a limit
Not credible within traditions 
of deontology or rights based 
theory. Those traditions offer 
no means for setting probabil‑
ity limits. Also, probabilities 
set by focusing on prohibited 
harms would implausibly 
neglect to consider benefits
Contract theories
Actions are permitted or 
prohibited by social 
contract
Under what circumstances 
does contractual prohibition 
of an action extend to a mix‑
ture of actions containing it?
Actual consent:
Mixture is prohibited 
unless all those 
affected accept its 
negative values
Not realistic “in a complex 
society in which everyone per‑
forms actions with marginal 
but additive effects on many 
people’s lives” (p 300)
Hypothetical consent:
Mixture is prohibited 
unless all those 
affected would accept 
it (its negative values) 
in an ideal decision 
situation
Questions about whether con‑
tracts that have not been made 
can have binding force transfer 
over from determinate deci‑
sion situations. There is no 
single rule for risk and uncer‑
tainty that all participants 
could be supposed to adhere 
to under ideal conditions
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risk imposition” summarises Hansson’s criteria for assessing the ethical acceptabil‑
ity of risk imposition.
Hansson’s Criteria for the Ethical Acceptability of Risk Imposition
In response to the challenge of morally appraising risk imposition, Hansson pro‑
poses a set of criteria based on a loosely contractarian approach that considers not 
only values and probabilities, but also duties, agency, intentions, consent, rights and 
equity. The central premise of his argument is that everyone has a prima facie right 
not to be exposed to risk, but that this right can be overridden in certain circum‑
stances [12, 13].
We do not reproduce Hansson’s arguments in detail, but start with his conclusion 
about when it is acceptable to impose risk:
Exposure of a person to risk is acceptable if:
 (i) this exposure is part of a persistently justice‑seeking social practice of risk‑
taking that works to her advantage and which she de facto accepts by making 
use of its advantages, and
 (ii) she has as much influence over her risk‑exposure as every similarly risk‑
exposed person can have without loss of the social benefits that justify the 
risk exposure [13, p. 108].
Hansson aims to specify the conditions under which risk imposition is morally 
acceptable. By ‘social practice of risk taking’, he means collections of activities 
about which decisions can be made regarding risk exposure. This can be contrasted 
with being required to make decisions on each individual risk‑exposing activity. For 
example, he takes driving cars to be a complex risk‑imposing social practice that is 
to everyone’s mutual benefit and is therefore permissible. He recognises that not all 
individuals will be similarly risk‑exposed, but conceives of complex chains of risk 
exchanges that are morally acceptable to the extent that the risks taken by one group, 
for example in their workplace, are “exchanged” for risks taken by others who might 
live in proximity to polluting factories, where both the work in question and the pol‑
luting factory’s products are to the mutual advantage of all concerned. Given the 
difficulty of working out the risk exchanges across societal wholes, he recommends 
considering risks and benefits as they occur within sectors, such as healthcare or 
transportation [13].
Hansson’s de facto acceptance clause aims to protect individuals. The require‑
ment that individuals de facto accept and benefit from participating in the relevant 
social practice aims to ensure that individuals cannot be treated as impersonal and 
interchangeable entities, as, for example, occurs in expected utility approaches that 
rely upon aggregations. The justice clause aims to exclude situations in which some 
individuals are exposed to risk for the benefit of others in exchanges that provide 
some level of advantage to all, but are nonetheless unfair. Here Hansson has in mind 
something like exploitative and dangerous labour conditions that provide some min‑
imal level of income to workers. These render workers better off in some sense than 
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if they had no employment, but the vast majority of benefits accrue unfairly to their 
employers and perhaps other elite groups who are not exposed to the work risks. 
Hansson does not require a perfectly just system of risk distribution, partly because 
it is unclear what this would entail. Rather, his justice clause seeks to dictate that the 
social practices in question should be aiming towards social justice, and in particular 
seeking to limit the risk exposures of people who suffer other social and economic 
disadvantages [13].
Hansson’s second criterion concerns influence, control and the limits of veto pow‑
ers that individuals have over others’ potentially risk‑imposing activities. It seeks to 
exclude situations in which otherwise acceptable, justice‑seeking risks are imposed 
by a benevolent dictator; or where each individual is able to dictate their own condi‑
tions of risk exposure and so effectively preclude social practices. It is a requirement 
for social cooperation in which each individual has maximal equal influence [13].
The examples Hansson provides are quite brief and general and we have not 
found a detailed application of his criteria to a specific social practice. In the next 
section, we explain ODx and the imposition of risk involved in disease prevention 
or early detection practices associated with ODx, before investigating whether these 
healthcare practices meet Hansson’s criteria in the subsequent section, “Assessing 
the ethical acceptability of imposing risk of ODx using Hansson’s criteria”.
Overdiagnosis
There is longstanding recognition of the fact that health measures aimed at early 
detection or prevention, may entail uncertain outcomes involving harm [32]. How‑
ever, the risks of preventive healthcare have received renewed attention in the con‑
text of overdiagnosis (ODx) arising from widespread uptake of interventions such 
as cancer and other disease screening. ODx refers to the phenomenon of individuals 
receiving diagnoses (often accompanied by interventions) that, on balance, lead to 
greater harm than benefit, making ODx one of the risks of various preventive prac‑
tices.2 [18, 23, 30] ODx is a counter‑intuitive phenomenon as detecting instances 
of disease is usually considered to be beneficial (given assumptions about the avail‑
ability of effective treatments and the value of knowledge about prognoses). ODx 
upends these assumptions as there are more harms than benefits from the diagnosis, 
often because the detected condition would not have progressed to advanced dis‑
ease, thus there is no benefit to detection. ODx is also counterfactual in that the 
diagnosis and any associated interventions cause harm on balance because people’s 
overall health states and experiences are worse than they would otherwise have been 
without the diagnostic intervention.
As well as being counter‑intuitive and counterfactual, ODx is mostly undetect‑
able at the individual level. In any population diagnosed with a particular disease, it 
rarely possible to distinguish individuals who receive a health‑benefitting diagnosis 
2 The definition of ODx is contested. Most medical accounts are based on the concept of non‑harmful or 
indolent disease [11, 33]. Others specify that ODx occurs when a diagnosis leads to a greater balance of 
harms over benefits, without invoking the notion of non‑harmful disease [8].
238 Health Care Analysis (2019) 27:231–248
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from those who are overdiagnosed. Instead, ODx is primarily visible as a popula‑
tion‑level phenomenon [8].
ODx is associated with several known precursors including systematic programs 
of disease identification such as cancer screening programs; and the broadening of 
diagnostic criteria for particular diseases, creating a larger cohort who then carry the 
disease label) [23].
Overdiagnosis as an Example of Risk Imposition
Healthcare is inherently risky as it always involves the possibility of iatrogenic harm 
[32]. However, some risks are willingly undertaken by individuals in response to 
their own requests for healthcare and are, at least to some extent, mitigated by fully 
informed and valid consent. These two features of request and consent suggest that 
therapeutic care is not a good fit with Hansson’s notion of social practices involving 
risk imposition. In contrast, preventive healthcare interventions are social practices 
in that they are part of the organized efforts of society to improve health. They are 
offered to healthy people in a systemic and usually state‑sanctioned way rather than 
in response to an individual health concern. Thus prima facie, preventive practices 
seem to be the kinds of social practices that involve potentially ethically problematic 
risk imposition.
Preventive care clearly falls within the scope of actions identified by Hansson as 
containing a mixture of outcomes that are indeterminate both in terms of value and 
probability—that is, preventive care is risky. For any individual patient, a preven‑
tive care action such as screening has an unknown mixture of benefits and harms. 
The individual may have the consequences of serious disease averted, or she may 
receive an ODx from which she gains no overall benefit. Once we turn to ODx, both 
the probability of ODx occurring, and the probability and nature of specific harms 
associated with ODx are uncertain. As mentioned, ODx generally cannot be identi‑
fied at the individual level, so people can be offered only population‑level informa‑
tion about the likelihood of ODx occurring. This information is often expressed as 
a probability estimate. Numerical probability estimates are widely used in health‑
care, but are by no means as reliable as the probability of throwing a six with a fair 
dice; in Wynne’s terms they are uncertain [37]. There is no general probability of 
ODx. Instead, the probability of being overdiagnosed must be specified in relation 
to particular diseases and particular diagnostic situations (e.g. probability of screen‑
ing‑detected breast cancer ODx [22, 35]; probability of gestational diabetes ODx 
during routine antenatal care etc.). Calculating the probability of disease‑specific 
ODx is epistemically challenging such that the methods and results are often bit‑
terly contested [28]. Probability estimates may lack precision or have questionable 
transferability due to sampling and study design issues [6]. For example, estimates 
of the probability of ODx generated by breast cancer screening lie between 10 and 
50% [34], analogous to a game of Russian roulette when the gun might contain one, 
two or three bullets. In addition, there are various ways of describing the probability 
of ODx for a condition. For example, the rate of ODx generated by breast‑cancer 
screening can be expressed in relation to numbers of women invited to be screened, 
women actually screened, or cancers detected by screening [20].
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As well as uncertainty about the probability of ODx for any particular condition, 
there is further uncertainty about the nature, magnitude and likelihood of specific 
sequelae (both harmful and beneficial) of ODx itself, and how to deal with varia‑
tions in individuals’ valuation of these [8]. One set of physical, psychological, social 
and economic harms arises from the offer of intervention and the imposed need to 
select an option from a menu on which there are no risk‑free alternatives. Once the 
spectre of undiagnosed but potentially treatable disease is raised, the individual is 
faced with a series of options in which various undesirable events or harms are pos‑
sible, including: making a poor decision, becoming anxious about doing so, expe‑
riencing regret, being pressured and/or negatively judged by others for whichever 
option she chooses and so forth. The complexity of the systems in which these 
options play out means that each one carries a mixture of outcomes with uncertain 
values and probabilities. A second set of harms arises from receiving a diagnostic 
label (such as anxiety, unwarranted patienthood or change in identity), while a third 
set flows from the cascade of interventions that follow diagnosis (including the costs 
of time off work and ongoing healthcare).
Thus while the risks arising from ODx are not unique in healthcare, ODx makes 
a good case study for examining the ethical acceptability of risk imposition in Hans‑
son’s terms. This is because ODx is a systemic problem, arising from preventive 
practices that are offered and delivered as services to individuals with justifications 
based on population level evidence of benefit, and often organised, at least to some 
extent, at a population level. ODx reflects structuring decisions made within health‑
care systems [6].
Current Approaches to Decision‑Making About Exposure to Risk of Harm Through 
ODx
The introduction of preventive practices that risk ODx is justified at a population 
level by weighing up potential benefits and burdens (a variety of expected utility 
analysis), based on the assumption that for an action to be acceptable, the likely 
overall benefits must outweigh the likely overall harms [13]. Using this approach, for 
example, the benefit of reducing breast cancer mortality in women who are screened 
has served as the justification for governments to introduce population screening for 
breast cancer, despite the risks (of ODx and other harms, such as pain from mam‑
mography or false positives). This expected utility approach tallies risks and poten‑
tial benefits at a population level to reach a decision about implementing, continuing 
or discontinuing interventions whose effects can be measured at a population level. 
The approach relies on assigning probabilities and values to each outcome on the 
assumption that these can be tallied up in a conclusive way.
There are recognised problems with an expected utility approach to decision 
making in conditions of risk [13, 26]. First, it is practically impossible to derive 
a single metric that does justice to the variety of potential outcomes, values and 
disvalues at stake in any decision. Some outcomes may be incommensurable, the 
significance of a particular disvalued outcome may vary with context and across 
individuals, and people (including policy leaders) have different levels of toler‑
ance for risk. Some benefits and harms will be unknown because they have not 
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yet occurred or been recognised, while there may not be agreement about or an 
explicit method for enumerating what counts as a relevant harm.
Next, the probability estimates required for expected utility approaches may 
be derived from different sources and will be more or less uncertain. Impor‑
tantly, not all of the harms associated with ODx can be assessed quantitatively. 
The possible loss of trust in healthcare secondary to high rates of ODx is one 
example that illustrates the challenge of creating an adequate hybrid metric and 
undermines the idea that the harms associated with ODx, and hence the magni‑
tude of the risk can be fully quantified.
Finally, the focus on probabilities and (dis)utilities excludes other morally rel‑
evant features. It takes more than knowledge of the probabilities and dis/values 
associated with specific outcomes to make a morally competent decision. Risks 
do not arise in a vacuum but attach to people for whom it matters morally why 
and by whom the risk is imposed, whether and how the people have contributed 
or consented to the risk, what relevant duties are observed or breached in the 
imposing of risk and how the risks are distributed in comparison with potential 
benefits between affected individuals [2, 12].
We note that one approach to addressing the ethical problem of imposing risk 
of ODx is via valid patient consent—typically via informed or shared decision 
making (SDM). This approach assumes that it is ethically acceptable to perform 
actions that impose risk of ODx if the risk‑exposed individual understands and 
voluntarily agrees [3, 13]. Several authors have however, identified the ethical 
inadequacy of consent as a response to the risk of ODx [6, 29, 31]. One concern 
is the poor quality of the information available for an SDM approach, such as the 
lack of consensus about the probability of ODx itself occurring and the nature of 
the associated harms [31]. Second, narrow SDM approaches may not adequately 
support autonomy in  situations where the information is complex or there are 
strong social pressures towards one decision rather than another [9, 10]. Both of 
these conditions apply in at least some overdiagnosing practices. Third, relying 
upon informed consent represents a potentially unfair shifting of the epistemic 
burden onto individual patients rather than policy makers or healthcare profes‑
sionals who have training and expertise in navigating complex medical and epi‑
demiological data [29]. Finally, decision aids often simplify information and 
understate the degree of uncertainty, presenting the decision as a clear choice 
between absolute numbers of persons harmed and benefited. Forcing this kind 
of trade‑off seems likely to trigger well‑recognised cognitive biases and moral 
intuitions—for example, willingness to allow many people to be harmed to save 
one life, or valuing of identified over statistical lives—which complicates the 
ethical justification of such decision‑making [6].
In summary, ODx occurs in the context of complex and systemic health‑
care practices, and raises a number of challenging questions concerning risk, 
for which current population level and individual level approaches seem ethi‑
cally inadequate. This suggests that overdiagnosing practices may benefit from 
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Assessing the Ethical Acceptability of Imposing Risk of ODx Using Hansson’s 
Criteria
Any attempt to ethically appraise the imposition of risk of ODx immediately 
faces the problem that ODx is heterogeneous and the different practices associ‑
ated with ODx have widely varying potential benefits and harms. This suggests 
that reasoning about the ethical acceptability of risk imposition in ODx needs to 
proceed case by case, so as to be responsive to the differing features of each case. 
Here we focus on three quite different interventions that risk ODx. Although the 
interventions differ, they all fit within Hansson’s notion of a social practice as 
they all: (1) rely upon the use of population level data for estimates of risks and 
benefits, and (2) are widely promoted and/or enforced via a combination of the 
market, professional standard‑setting, or health system structuring. Thus, we pro‑
pose, these three practices all represent collective forms of social practice of the 
kind in which Hansson is interested. The first is a breast cancer screening pro‑
gram that is publicly funded, free at point of service, and articulated with high 
quality universally accessible clinical care (‘Ideal breast cancer screening’) [17, 
19]. The second is the introduction and marketing of a new commercial diagnos‑
tic technology for personal genome sequencing [16]. The third is promulgation 
through health systems of a clinical practice guideline developed by experts that 
lowers the diagnostic threshold for hypertension [4, 36].
To facilitate the application of Hansson’s criteria to these three overdiagnosing 
practices we re‑framed them as four questions, responses to which can be found 
in Tables 1, 2, 3 and 4 with a summary in Table 5: 
1. Is the risk exposure part of a persistently justice‑seeking social practice of risk 
taking?
2. Does the social practice of risk‑taking work to individuals’ advantage?
3. Do individuals de facto accept the risk exposure?
4. Does each risk‑exposed individual have as much influence over her risk‑exposure 
as every similarly risk‑exposed person can have without loss of the social benefits 
that justify the risk exposure?
    Tables 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 show that none of these three interventions meet Hans‑
son’s criteria for justified risk imposition. The ideal breast cancer screening program 
is, broadly speaking, a justice‑seeking social practice, but it is not obviously to indi‑
vidual women’s benefit, is arguably not widely understood to be a risk‑taking prac‑
tice and individuals generally have little influence over the nature of their risk expo‑
sure as they are poorly informed as consumers and excluded from the design and 
implementation of the program. Commercial personal genome sequencing services 
are not justice‑seeking and nor do they permit equal influence over risk exposure. 
The responses to the other two questions are equivocal and would depend upon the 
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particularities of the service in question. Assessing the acceptability of risk imposi‑
tion associated with the development and implementation of clinical practice guide‑
lines (CPGs) is complex. While the in‑principle aims of CPGs might be justifiable 
Table 2  Does the social practice of risk taking work to individuals’ advantage?
Overdiagnosing practice Response
Ideal breast cancer screening Equivocal: it is not obviously advantageous to 
women to participate in screening [19, 21]. The 
extent to which access to effective breast cancer 
treatment is dependent upon having a screening 
program is also unclear. If outcomes for women 
were equal with or without screening, the prac‑
tice would not be to individuals’ advantage. If 
outcomes were better for all with screening, this 
criterion may be met
Commercial personal genome sequencing services Equivocal: depending on the extent to which the 
testing produces benefits (such as actionable 
information or reassurance) for those who buy it. 
Inasmuch as the service is limited to those able 
to buy it, it arguably excludes individuals who 
might be advantaged by participating
Clinical practice guideline lowering the diagnostic 
threshold for hypertension
No (on balance): 80% of those newly identified as 
having hypertension have no incremental benefit 
in reduction of cardiovascular disease but do 
have the harms of disease labelling. However, 
approximately 9% do receive a net benefit [4]
Table 1  Is the risk exposure part of a persistently justice‑seeking social practice of risk taking?
Overdiagnosing practice Response
Ideal breast cancer screening Yes (in principle): in this best‑case scenario for a 
breast screening service, the aim is to provide 
equal access for all women to screening and 
treatment. The risk exposures of the social 
practice of screening are (theoretically) spread 
equally amongst all participating
Commercial personal genome sequencing services No: a commercial service is not justice‑seeking 
in Hansson’s terms if the company focuses on 
profitability and satisfying customers’ desires for 
information, and shows little or no concern about 
the imposition of risk on potentially vulnerable 
or disadvantaged individuals
Clinical practice guideline lowering the diagnostic 
threshold for hypertension
No (on balance): to the extent that the expert 
guideline development group has conflicts of 
interest, and particularly if the expanded criteria 
expose more people to risk of ODx without any 
clear contribution to equity or health outcomes 
more broadly, the guideline is not justice‑seeking 
in any meaningful way [4]
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Table 3  Do individuals de facto accept the risk exposure?
Overdiagnosing practice Response
Ideal breast cancer screening No: de facto many women do accept the risk of ODx 
as the uptake of breast cancer screening is rela‑
tively high, but to the extent that they have little 
knowledge or comprehension of the risk of ODx 
and other potential harms, they do not understand 
screening to be a risk‑taking practice [5, 25]
Commercial personal genome sequencing services Equivocal: depending on how the offer is made by 
the company. If the company provides high‑quality 
genetic counselling before testing, then yes. If 
company sells tests without ensuring access to 
high‑quality genetic counselling, then no
Clinical practice guideline lowering the diagnostic 
threshold for hypertension
No: individuals are likely to have little knowledge 
or understanding of either the process of guideline 
development or the risk of being overdiagnosed 
with hypertension
Table 4  Does each risk‑exposed individual have as much influence over her risk‑exposure as every simi‑
larly risk‑exposed person can have without loss of the social benefits that justify the risk exposure?
Overdiagnosing practice Response
Ideal breast cancer screening No: the program is devised and implemented by 
experts
Commercial personal genome sequencing services No: there is no obvious mechanism of influencing 
company policy directly. If people can access good 
information and support to choose which compa‑
nies to use and which tests to have, they may have 
some scope for indirect influence
Clinical practice guideline lowering the diagnostic 
threshold for hypertension
No: clinical practice guidelines, including diagnostic 
thresholds, are generally still developed with only 
limited and/or tokenistic citizen input. This may 
in the future change, given active initiatives to 
increase citizen input into technology appraisal 
and guideline development [27]
Table 5  Summary of responses




Clinical practice guideline 
lowering the diagnostic 
threshold for hypertension
Q1: Justice seeking Yes (in principle) No No (on balance)
Q2: Individual advantage Equivocal Equivocal No (on balance)
Q3: Acceptance of risk expo‑
sure
No Equivocal No
Q4: Equal influence over risk 
exposure
No No No
244 Health Care Analysis (2019) 27:231–248
1 3
on Hansson’s account, the particularities of each CPG are relevant, and our example 
of a CPG that lowers the diagnostic threshold fails to meet any of Hansson’s crite‑
ria. The formulation of recommendations requires complex assessments of benefits, 
risks and of various ethical, legal and social considerations. Conflicts of interest are 
highly likely within expert groups [13], and may be particularly problematic among 
expert committees that lower diagnostic thresholds in medicine [24].
Challenges with Implementing Hansson’s Criteria
As Tables 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 show, it is a complex matter attempting to apply Hans‑
son’s criteria to examples of overdiagnosing practices. A major challenge relates to 
the consideration of healthcare (or aspects of it) as a risk‑imposing social practice. 
Healthcare is highly complex and the organisation and funding of it varies consider‑
ably between jurisdictions. Healthcare is more obviously akin to the social practices 
that Hansson identifies (such as driving cars) in countries with universally acces‑
sible healthcare free at the point of need, but less obviously so in countries with 
for‑profit healthcare or mixed public–private systems. In addition, the boundaries 
of healthcare are poorly delineated and contested even in publicly‑funded universal 
systems, making it difficult to determine what should be considered part of the com‑
plex exchange of risks and benefits Hansson envisages within practices [13].
Taken as a notional whole, it is far from clear that it should be necessary to accept 
the risks of ODx as part and parcel of accessing the overall benefits of healthcare, 
especially where the risk of ODx results from redefining diseases, as occurred with 
the guideline for hypertension. In addition, the overall functioning of the healthcare 
system does not seem to rely upon the presence of specific services or interventions, 
in perhaps the way that the traffic system as a whole requires all of its various ele‑
ments (although even this is arguable).
Scoping and defining the social practice of interest is crucial to the application of 
Hansson’s criteria because the way that this is done has implications for assessing 
whether the practice works to an individual’s advantage, her acceptance of it and her 
degree of influence over her risk exposure. If we take the practice to be healthcare 
as a whole, then it is probably uncontroversial that having a universal healthcare 
system is to the advantage of all individuals. But if we focus on specific preven‑
tive practices that risk ODx, it becomes more problematic to claim that they advan‑
tage individuals. Resolution of the problem would depend on investigating people’s 
views about the value of having particular screening programs or diagnostic thresh‑
olds in their healthcare system.
Assessing individuals’ de facto acceptance of a practice is also challenging. If 
the practice is universal healthcare per se, it will be difficult to assess individuals’ 
acceptance or rejection of the practice, although people could be asked via political 
processes such as referendums. If the practice is defined at the level of a service or 
intervention, empirical assessment of its acceptance might seem more feasible, but 
it would be problematic to assume that individuals who accept an overdiagnosing 
practice fully—or even adequately—understand its implications and recognise rel‑
evant nuances (such as a contested evidence base or influential conflicts of interest), 
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and it is a further empirical question whether people understand the balance of risks 
and benefits, even when they express a strong opinion in favour of or against a prac‑
tice. Assessment of acceptance is further complicated if there are no alternatives: 
people’s tolerance of risks in an existing system is not a good indicator of what they 
would accept if they had more options.
The scope for people to have equal influence over their risk exposure in health‑
care is in some senses highly limited. Health services/practices are mostly shaped by 
expert medical knowledge implemented within government policy and in competi‑
tion with other priorities. There is often little room for ordinary citizens to contribute 
to policy making regarding the nature and extent of risks that could be acceptably 
imposed given the kinds of benefits that might accompany the risks. Initiatives such 
as citizens’ juries offer mechanisms in keeping with the democratic ethos Hansson 
espouses, but no healthcare system has contemplated using deliberative processes 
to inform all of its decisions. Some have attempted this in a limited way—for exam‑
ple, the NICE Citizens’ Council in the UK [27], but the resource intensiveness and 
limitations on this process suggest it would not be practicable to enlist citizens in all 
necessary decisions. In fact, it is unclear how this criterion can ever be met as even 
in Hansson’s example of driving, citizens have few formal opportunities to influence 
traffic regulations. The criterion could be formally fulfilled by saying everyone was 
equally voiceless regarding traffic laws, but this manner of fulfilment effectively ren‑
ders the criterion powerless: denying everyone influence over the practice in ques‑
tion defeats the object of the criterion.
Finally, Hansson says little regarding whether all the criteria must be met in order 
to justify exposing individuals to risk, and whether meeting each criterion admits of 
degrees or must be absolute. As we have shown, none of our three examples met the 
all the criteria. Prima facie, then, we might conclude that all three practices involve 
unjustifiable imposition of risk of ODx.
Despite the challenges in implementing Hansson’s criteria for specific practices, 
we believe that the exercise has been valuable. Healthcare, especially preventive 
and early detection practices, are risky. As the harms are potentially serious and far‑
reaching, we need a way of morally appraising the acceptability of imposing the 
relevant risks. To date, Hansson offers the most comprehensive criteria for this task, 
justifying a detailed investigation. Applying Hansson’s criteria has illuminated the 
complexity of practices that impose risk and the challenges of assessing the justifi‑
ability of those practices, while also identifying reasons why some risk imposing 
practices may be unjustifiable.
Conclusion
The results of our analysis are thought provoking in that none of the three preven‑
tive and early detection practices that risk ODx meet Hansson’s proposed criteria for 
ethically justifiable risk imposition. Should we therefore conclude that these three 
practices are unjustified in imposing risks of ODx? Such a conclusion is consistent 
with views about the ethical unacceptability of at least some practices that risk ODx 
[7, 8, 29, 31]. The value of Hansson’s approach lies in forcing a step back to ask 
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specific and pertinent questions about particular health care practices. In so doing, it 
helps us to move beyond potentially simplistic tallies of benefits and burdens, and, 
importantly, to incorporate considerations of justice, both substantive and proce‑
dural. Prima facie, this seems morally correct. It would be difficult to argue that 
healthcare practices that risk ODx should not be broadly justice seeking. The other 
ideas in Hansson’s account also seem consistent with much contemporary moral and 
political reasoning: practices that risk ODx should be acceptable to the population 
in question and be to their overall advantage, and citizens should have some say over 
the implementation of these practices. That the three instances we have considered 
fail Hansson’s criteria is perhaps a strong indication that at least some healthcare 
practices that impose risk of ODx are not justifiable.
Further work to refine Hansson’s criteria will be necessary to enhance their value 
for ethical analyses of risk‑imposing practices. This will include investigating ways 
of assessing new risk‑imposing interventions and potential changes to health poli‑
cies or services that would shift risks across populations and individuals [15]. Fol‑
lowing our attempt to apply the criteria to concrete examples, we conclude that their 
primary contribution may be in broadening the range of morally relevant factors that 
should be taken into account when decisions are made about interventions that will 
impose risk. Whether or not they can constitute a system for normative reasoning 
that clearly applies to preventive healthcare practices will require further testing, 
application and debate.
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